Swedish Bikini Statistics

Previous BS installment here.

Statistics are like a bikini. What they present is suggestive, but what they conceal is vital--Aaron Levenstein

Real Swedish BS, (via Megan McArdle):

Geier adds, with laughable understatement: "Obviously, Sweden does not have the same degree of racial diversity as the U.S. does, but its population is far from 'homogeneous.'" This is a mind-bogglingly imprecise comparison. First, Geier, debunker of myths about Sweden and Swedish socialism, surely knows that the plurality of the foreign-born in Sweden are Finns and Finlandsvensk—Swedish-speaking Finns—who are very much a part of the Nordic welfare tradition. This will soon change, with the influx of asylum-seekers from the Middle East, and we'll soon see how much stress this puts on the "Swedish model." That said, and as Geier seems to concede but not comprehend, the remaining 87 percent are native-born Swedes with, for the most part, a common cultural, religious/irreligious, social, and political heritage.

Sweden does have the highest rate of workers on sick leave in Europe, despite being consistently ranked by the OECD as Europe's healthiest country.

The government figure of 7 percent unemployment was repeatedly mocked by both former Prime Minister Göran Persson's detractors and allies. A study by McKinsey Global estimated the true figure—which included those on sick leave, in early retirement, in jobs programs—to be between 15 and 17 percent.

But Google Pundit Geier again goes back to her blog source, Lane Kenworthy, who writes that "The welfare state is generous, but most able-bodied Swedes of working age are expected to be employed." Yes, they are expected to be employed. But the Swedish daily Aftonbladet reported in 2006, "shocking figures" demonstrated that 109,000 people under 30 were unemployed, an 81 percent increase over 2001. These numbers, supplied by the government, are also almost surely understated.

And the problem of unemployment in Sweden loops back around to the difficulty Sweden has had in integrating its immigrants into the job market. As Swedish economist Esra Karakaya wrote in Aftonbladet in 2006, the unemployment rate among immigrants in Sweden is 29 percent—another staggering figure, in marked contrast to the joblessness rate among immigrants in this country. This, Karakaya convincingly argues, is "because the labor market is governed by rigid job security laws" that are incompatible with a globalized economy.

In other words, Swedish social democracy, and its concomitant hostility to entrepreneurship and overly generous network of financial benefits for immigrants and asylum seekers, is a significant contributor to high unemployment rates.

One final point. Amazingly, Geier revels that "the Swedish economy is competitive, the school system offers choice, and pensions are partially privatized" but fails to note—or is simply unaware—that almost all of these policies were either implemented or introduced by the conservative government of Carl Bildt, against the strenuous objections of the Swedish left, after the economy sunk into a deep recession in the 1990s.